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simultaneity and solidarity in the time of 
Permanent War
M a r i e  lo
The war that is going on beneath order and peace, the war that  
undermines our society and divides it in a binary mode is, basically,  
a race war.
— Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended
In their defense of the Muslim travel ban, lawyers for the Trump adminis-  tration invoked the plenary power doctrine to justify its legality: “The 
Order was well under the president’s authority under Congress’ delegation, 
particularly in an area like immigration, in which the admission to the United 
States of foreign aliens is subject to plenary control by the political branches.”1 
By invoking this doctrine, the lawyers drew on the powers inherent in sov-
ereignty, whereby the political branches of government had “plenary”— that 
is, “exclusive” or “unlimited or absolute”— power to secure the nation, pro-
tect its borders, and regulate entry without need for judicial review.2 This 
reference to plenary power in support of Executive Order 13769, “Protect- 
ing the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,” high-
lights what seems to be a foundational contradiction of the powers inherent 
in U.S. sovereignty: namely, that such exceptional or “extraconstitutional” 
measures in the name of national security are routinely exercised in the quo-
tidian domain of immigration, conceived as threats to the racial cultural 
order of the nation- state.3 Such a point is made explicit in Executive Order 
13769: “In order to protect Americans, the United States must ensure that 
those admitted to this country do not bear hostile attitudes towards it and 
its founding principles. . . . In addition, the United States should not admit 
those who engage in acts of bigotry or hatred (including “honor” killings, 
other forms of violence against women, or the persecution of those who 
practice religions different from their own) or those who would oppress 
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Americans of any race, gender, or sexual orientation.”4 Setting aside the irony 
of this order’s racist exclusionary tactics to fight “acts of bigotry and hatred,” 
the implicit racialization of “foreign terrorists” and the invocation of plenary 
power to defend the Muslim ban draws on the legal precedent set by the 
1889 case of Chae Chan Ping v. United States (also known as the Chinese 
Exclusion Case), which codified racialized exclusion when it barred resident 
Chae Chan Ping from returning to the United States on the basis of national 
sovereignty and security.5
Though plenary power is described as an “obscure” immigration doc-
trine in mainstream media, the domain of plenary power is broad, and it 
operates openly, “hidden in plain sight.”6 Four days before the travel ban, 
on January 24, 2017, Trump issued a series of executive orders, this time 
resuming the construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline and the Dakota 
Access Pipeline. In the shadow cast by the media attention on the travel 
ban, the Army Corp of Engineers razed the encampments of the Water Pro-
tectors and activists, overriding the 1851 and 1868 Laramie Treaties that 
affirmed Indigenous sovereignty over this territory. Though these orders do 
not mention plenary power, plenary power has long shaped federal Indian 
policy, dating to the nineteenth century. Codified in the constitutional era, 
congressional plenary power has been invoked to undermine and overrule 
Indigenous sovereignty as well as justify the colonization of territories.7 In 
their civil suit against the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, for example, Robert 
Flying Hawk and the Yankton Sioux Tribe challenge the limits of plenary 
power over Indigenous sovereignty, highlighting the extent to which plenary 
power’s unlimited federal power over tribes remains an object of Indigenous 
resistance.8
Despite the imbalance of media attention, the simultaneity of these two 
sets of executive orders index the centrality of the plenary power doctrine 
to an extractive settler security state forged in the crisis of permanent war. 
Characterized as “constitutionally exceptional,” plenary power is to be in- 
voked when the security and sovereignty of the nation are under threat.9 In 
the “War on Terror,” September 11 is cast as inaugurating a state of exception 
that justifies indefinite detention, extraordinary rendition, and the suspen-
sion of constitutional rights; unsurprisingly, Executive Order 13769 opens 
with reference to this event.10 However, the extraconstitutional status of 
“enemy combatants” in Guantánamo Bay recalls that of Japanese Americans 
during WWII, who were labeled as “enemy aliens” and interned in the name 
of national security.11 Though these are wartime examples, there is a gene- 
alogy to plenary power and the U.S. state of exception that exceeds these 
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events. As Natsu Saito Taylor argues, if we consider them in relation to areas 
in which plenary powers are primarily and routinely exercised— immigra- 
tion, Indian affairs, and U.S. territories— it becomes apparent that there is a 
regularity in the exercise of plenary power and that the objects of this routine 
exceptionality are Indigenous peoples, immigrants, colonized peoples, and 
people of color.12 The permanent war that is supposedly “underneath” and 
masked by civility, as described by Foucault in the opening epigraph, is a 
painfully obvious state of open and perpetual war for those whose elimina-
tion, exclusion, and rightlessness are a structural feature of U.S. sovereignty. 
For people targeted by these policies, these are not historical anomalies. 
Rather, this nineteenth- and early twentieth- century doctrine that emerged 
in the “Indian, alien, and territory cases,” as Sarah Cleveland argues, “contin-
ues to be the controlling constitutional authority in all three areas.”13 Since 
the plenary power doctrine is the controlling constitutional authority in 
which the judiciary defers to the political branches, and the technologies of 
perpetual war become normalized as “necessities of the state” and opera-
tionalized by bureaucratic officials, immigration officers, and the police.14
“War,” Foucault writes, “is the motor behind institutions and order.”15 It 
organizes and consolidates the matrix of power and domination that lies 
beneath peace, civility, and wealth. This war that underlies social organiza-
tion is a race war in perpetuity, animated by the ongoing threats to white 
settler security posed by racial others: “We have to defend society against all 
the biological threats posed by the other race, the subrace, the counterrace 
that we are, despite ourselves, bringing into existence.”16 The circumstances 
of this permanent race war is illustrated by how these two simultaneous 
executive orders discursively “bookend” what seems to be a war without 
beginning or end. Within settler colonial history, the figure of the “Indian,” 
as Jodi A. Byrd argues, “is the original enemy combatant,” the original state-
less enemy that threatens the territorial coherence of the settler nation.17 In 
the context of the “War on Terror,” the “Indian” as a signifier of terrorism, 
according to Keith Feldman, reconstructs and positions certain parts of the 
globe “at the frontier of the U.S. homeland.”18 The mapping of the Indian Wars 
onto the military operations in the Middle East links the “War on Terror” as 
part of an ongoing settler imperial project dependent on oil and territory. 
Just as the “Indian” is the prototypical figure for barbaric threats to the foun-
dations of civilization and the resources of settler society, the mechanisms 
of border security and enforcement rely on a racialized concept of “terror-
ist” that derives its legal prototype from the threat Chinese “aliens” posed to 
white property and nationhood in the late nineteenth century. Indeed, as 
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this article demonstrates, it is the conjoining of these two figures that orga-
nizes and gives form to the constant state of exception that underwrites 
perpetual war.19 The construction of American Indians and Asians as “ter-
rorists” or “enemy combatants” (to use these terms descriptively but anach-
ronistically) reflects their structural and constitutive relation to the settler 
security state as well as to each other. In examining the emergence and appli-
cation of the plenary power doctrine, this article explores how the securing 
of white settler property was codified through the conjoining of American 
Indian dispossession and Chinese exclusion, and how shifting and blurred 
definitions of who was “native” and who was “alien” helped to constitute prop-
erty as white in the name of national security.
In response to the Critical Ethnic Studies Journal’s call for papers on soli-
darities of nonalignment, this article argues for the importance of plenary 
power doctrine as an object of comparative ethnic studies critique. As men-
tioned earlier, the Chinese Exclusion Case was an influential plenary power 
case, and it has been a seminal case in U.S. immigration history. In the con-
text of American Indian legal history, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock (1903), which 
abrogated tribal treaties and led to arguably “the most massive uncompen-
sated taking of property in United States history,” is often cited as the “supreme 
articulation of unfettered plenary power.”20 These cases, together with the 
constellation of early twentieth- century cases known as the Insular Cases, 
which grants congressional plenary power over the “unincorporated” terri-
tories of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and Guam, lay the founda-
tions for plenary power.21 Despite being a “foundation of immigration law,” 
“a cornerstone of U.S. law as it is applied to American Indian nations,” and 
the prevailing legal justification for U.S. colonization, plenary power doc-
trine remains underexamined in comparative and critical ethnic studies 
and in the growing body of scholarship that tracks the intersections of race, 
migration, and coloniality.22 However, rather than make solidarity the con-
dition for or the telos of organizing and critique, I focus on how plenary 
power consolidates the racial regime of settler colonialism by considering 
solidarity in temporal terms— as an effect and function of simultaneity. In 
unmooring solidarity from identity formations, an idealization of commu-
nity, or shared struggles, solidarity in terms of simultaneity is necessarily 
a provisional analytic that organizes the imbricated projects of white settler 
imperialism within a momentary synchronous temporal frame. The history 
of American Indian colonization and dispossession and Asian immigra- 
tion and exclusion are reframed from independent and separate historical 
formations to nonequivalent but overlapping, conjoined, and synchronous 
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processes. Simultaneity also temporalizes racial capitalism’s technology of 
“antirelationality,” which Ruth Gilmore Wilson argues, “is the state- sanctioned 
and/or extra- legal production and exploitation of group- differentiated vul-
nerabilities to premature death, in distinct yet densely interconnected politi-
cal geographies.”23 Elaborating on Wilson’s argument, Jodi Melamed notes 
that this “discreteness” is capitalism’s “particular feat”: “to accomplish differ-
entiation as dense networks and nodes of social separateness.”24 Solidarity 
in terms of simultaneity makes visible the rhetoric of divergent temporality 
that underwrites plenary power under settler colonial and racial capitalism.
In considering the historical– political mechanisms that result in simul- 
taneous but nonequivalent and even divergent effects of plenary power, I 
argue that plenary power is a particular technique of the racial regime of 
settler imperialism founded on a constant state of emergency. The codifi- 
cation of plenary power, conjoined through Indian affairs and immigration, 
highlights the extent to which the formation of U.S. settler state sovereignty 
is predicated on the permanent external “threat” posed by Indigenous peo-
ples and people of color. While the domain of plenary power is interna-
tional rather than domestic, as I will show, it is the instrumentalization of 
the shifting boundaries between the domestic and international that gives 
plenary power its urgency and broad territorial reach. This piece is part of 
a broader argument that examines plenary power in relation to the colo- 
nization of unincorporated territories acquired as a result of the Spanish– 
American War. But given the limitations of space, I am unable to develop 
that here. I hope it suffices to say for the moment that it is the rhetoric of 
exceptionality that runs through these different cases.25 Plenary power not 
only relies on the rhetorical construction of exceptionalism and thus, at times, 
“extraconstitutional” measures to counter the extraordinary threat that such 
terrorism demands. Rather, such exceptionalism is a structural and consti-
tutive feature of the powers inherent in U.S. sovereignty. And despite the 
different temporalities that, in turn, define the “threats” posed by Indians 
and immigrants, they simultaneously structure the nation as founded on the 
crisis of permanent war that justifies the suspension of juridical review and 
necessitates a “constitution- free zone.”26
siMultaneous yet diverGent teMPoralities
The codification of plenary power in the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies was a period of accelerated Native dispossession and vitriolic anti- 
Chinese sentiment. As legal scholar Bethany Berger argues, “The end of the 
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figure 1. News clipping: 
proximity in print of Indian 
removal and Chinese exclusion. 
From Wheeling Register, West 
Virginia, March 1, 1880, p. 1.
CES 5.1-2.indd   44 03/11/2019   6:58:40 PM
P S imultanei t y  and Sol idar i t y  in  the  Time of  Permanent  War   •   45   O
nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth were one of the most 
coercive and racist periods in Indian law,” in which Native peoples were 
forcibly assimilated and stripped of their land and sovereignty.27 This was 
simultaneously the period of Asian exclusion, a period described as one of 
the most xenophobic and restrictive in its immigration policies, paving the 
way for the construction of the “illegal alien” and the apparatuses instituted 
to regulate it.28 Comparisons and conflations between Chinese and American 
Indians were common in nineteenth- century discourse and often centered 
on the idea that Indigenous peoples of the Americas were Asians who crossed 
over the Bering Straits between what is now Russia and Alaska.29 However, 
despite the relative isolation of the historiography of American Indian dis-
possession from that of Chinese exclusion, a cursory review of newspaper 
reports of state- and national- court and legislative proceedings reveal how 
debates over Indian removal and Asian exclusion were often reported on the 
same page, occupying the same discursive space that informs the imagined 
community of the U.S. settler nation (see Figure 1).30
Moreover, these reports also highlight the extent to which  the “Indian 
Question” and the “Chinese Question” were concomitantly debated on the 
House floor and often by the same people.31 Contrary to how we have sub-
sequently understood and narrated the histories of removal, dispossession, 
and exclusion, for readers of nineteenth- century news, the “proximity in 
newsprint” of the “Indian Question” and the “Chinese Question” (also alter-
natively described as the “Indian Problem” and the “Chinese Problem”) was 
a constant “reminder of their symbolic and literal relationships” and their 
characterization as concurrent obstacles to white settler sovereignty.32
Despite the spatial connections implied by their proximity and their rep-
resentation within the same discursive spaces, these respective “questions” 
are often characterized in divergent temporalities with respect to the telos 
of nation. Native dispossession and the closing of the western frontier often 
reduces American Indians to figures of the past, whereas the construction of 
the Chinese as unassimilable heathens anticipates an Oriental invasion that 
will erase Western civilization. This tension between the spatial proximity 
of the “Indian Question” and the “Chinese Question” and the divergent tem-
porality they are ascribed as inhabiting is encapsulated in the cover of an 
1879 issue of Harper’s Weekly by the political cartoonist Thomas Nash (see 
Figure 2).
A commentary about the cyclical nature of xenophobia generally and 
about white attitudes to Chinese immigrants specifically, this image frames 
its critique by relying on a visual analogy between the Indian and the 
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the “Chinese Question” occupy the same space to comment on their divergent 
temporalities. From an 1879 issue of Harper’s Weekly, by Thomas Nast.
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Chinese, placing them in the same representational space to comment 
on their respective divergent and antithetical relations to the teleology of 
the nation. Identified by the stereotypes of the Indian headdress and the 
coolie queue, they also mirror each other through their respective pipes— 
the Indian with the ceremonial pipe and the Chinese with an opium pipe. 
A poster on the “Chinese Problem” is in their sightline, and the “Red Gen- 
tleman’s” comment, “Pale face ‘fraid you crowd him out, as he did to me,” 
posits the “Red Gentleman” as a figure of the country’s past and the “Yellow 
Gentleman” as its ominous future. The series of posters on the right archive 
this antiforeigner history, in which “Every Dog (No Distinction of Color) 
Has His Day,” demonstrating how the previous targets of such racism are 
now leading the charge against the Chinese. A Black man lies await the back-
ground, whose “time is coming,” suggesting that after the “Chinese Ques-
tion” is “answered” the “Negro Question” will need to be addressed and— 
following the logic of “every dog has his day”— potentially spearheaded by 
the Chinese.
In situating anti- Chinese racism within this longer history of xenopho-
bia, the image also posits a developmental narrative of the nation that is 
mapped by the visual homology created between the American Indian and 
the Chinese immigrant in the image that hangs above the conversing gen-
tlemen. The divergent directions of travel suggest two temporal orders and 
trajectories of development. The nation’s past, marked by the closing of the 
western frontier and the “vanishing” of American Indians, is captured in 
the image of the train driving the Indian to the Pacific. The train, as the 
engine of Manifest Destiny that links the East Coast to the West, is not only 
iconic of civilization and technological modernity but it is also a stand- 
in for the nation with the term “U.S.” emblazoned on its side. In the bot- 
tom half of the image, the train retreats eastward, chased by the Chinese 
immigrant. Whereas the journey westward suggests the advancement of a 
modern, industrialized nation, the second image implies that the nation’s 
progress would be undone by unchecked Chinese immigration. This “cau-
tionary tale” figures Indians as part of the nation’s primitive past and 
Chinese immigrants as a future that threatens to return it to its past. Yet 
this interpretation relies on reading the poster as divided into two images 
that we read horizontally. If we also view the Indian and the Chinese immi-
grant and their respective place in the relation to the nation vertically (i.e., 
synchronically), what it suggests is how the nation’s sense of itself tempo-
rally— in terms of a developmental narrative of national progress and terri-
torial expansion— depends on the simultaneous characterization of American 
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Indians as existing in the past and Chinese as the future that must be pre-
vented. Facilitating what Mark Rifkin describes as a settler colonial form of 
“temporal totalization,” this simultaneity reinforces the temporality of the 
nation as both an “a priori political form” in which racism can be remedi-
ated in the narrative of progress and also the “only basis for marking the 
passage of time.”33
In capturing both the simultaneity and temporal disjuncture of the “Indian 
Question” and the “Chinese Question,” however, this image reflects how U.S. 
settler sovereignty is unable to acknowledge its consolidation through dif-
ferentially racialized labor and chattel slavery. References to antiblack rac-
ism in the smaller poster atop the long series of posters on the right- hand 
side equates Black oppression with xenophobia. In situating antiblackness 
within a history of anti- Chinese racism and previous anti- Irish and anti- 
Dutch sentiments, this “timeline” erases the Atlantic slave trade, forced migra-
tion, and the centrality of slavery to nation building. Thus the emancipated 
slave, depicted as languidly reclining with his hands in his pockets, can only 
be represented as a figure of indolence, whose freedom threatens white set-
tler society. For while the phrase “My day is coming” gestures to the cyclical 
nature of racism and xenophobia, it also hints at the impending social, eco-
nomic, and racial pressures of the migration of emancipated slaves from the 
South to the West. By hovering in the background, the African American 
figure reminds us that the discursive proximities between American Indi-
ans and Chinese immigrants are inescapably haunted by the afterlife of 
slavery and racial capitalism. This exchange between the “Red Gentlemen” 
and the “Yellow Gentleman,” which reduces racism to anxieties about popula-
tion concerns (i.e., “being crowded out”), territorial coherence, and culture, 
can only make sense by “bracketing off” racialized labor and the antirela-
tional foundations of racial capitalism. Chinese immigrants can only be 
imagined as a threat to civilization if their labor and contributions to build-
ing the infrastructures of settler colonial modernity are erased. American 
Indians are reduced to pitiful figures of the past unable to survive because 
they do not know how to labor and profit from the land, and thus cannot, 
under a Lockean conception of property, claim ownership. The commodifi-
cation of African Americans as property and whose labor has been central 
to the southern economy is replaced by a figure depicted as the antithesis of 
labor, someone whose idleness will drain the country’s resources. The con-
stitution of U.S. settler sovereignty, as this cartoon demonstrates, necessar-
ily displaces and reconfigures racialized labor and property into questions 
of security and territoriality.
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conJoininG disPossession and exclusion in Plenary PoWer
The logic of security and permanent war that underwrites plenary power 
often blurs between the domestic and international. To clarify this point, I 
first turn to the many variations in the definition of “federal plenary power” 
and the different assessments of its domain.34 Sarah Cleveland, in her mag-
isterial “Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the 
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs,” argues 
that plenary power deals with foreign affairs and stems from “the power 
inherent in sovereignty” to regulate one’s borders as an equal among nations, 
a concept promulgated by the seminal work of Emer de Vattel and his 1758 
The Law of Nations, or the Principles of International Law. In contrast, Mat-
thew Lindsay suggests that the plenary powers doctrine is less concerned 
with “inherent sovereignty,” but rather is a response to the sense of national 
peril at the hands of invading immigrants.35 In the government’s dealing 
with Native peoples, David E. Wilkins notes that the shifting definitions 
of plenary power often hinge on whether it was “based on a constitutional 
or extra- constitutional doctrine,” reflecting the colonizing contortions that 
characterizes American Indians as both sovereign nations and wards of the 
state.36 Despite disagreement on the original articulation of plenary powers, 
what these debates reveal is the unsettled domain of its reach, a blurring that 
is reflected in the key cases in which plenary power is most clearly spelled 
out, notably the Chinese Exclusion Case and later Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.
As plenary power cases, the Chinese Exclusion Case and Lone Wolf v. Hitch-
cock are landmark cases in immigration law and history and in Indigenous 
studies and legal history respectively. However, little has been written about 
how they overlap and conjoin and what this may mean for our understand-
ing of the historical– political intersections of dispossession and exclusion.37 
The fact that the Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock ruling, which led to one of the larg-
est land thefts in American Indian history, cites the Chinese Exclusion Case 
is notable and requires exploration. In this section I examine the intersec-
tion of these two cases to consider the juridical proximities and temporali-
ties that underwrite the permanent war of plenary power.
The conditions for permanent war can be found in the Chinese Exclu- 
sion Case and its codification of “immigration as invasion.”38 In 1887 Chae 
Chan Ping, a twelve- year legal resident of the United States, went to China 
to visit his family. Since the enactment of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act 
prevented new Chinese laborers from entering the country, he obtained 
a certificate of reentry to prove his resident status as outlined by the act’s 
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provisions. On October 1, 1888— seven days before his return— Congress 
passed a law that barred all Chinese laborers from entering, nullifying his 
certificate of reentry. Chae Chan Ping challenged this nullification as un- 
constitutional on the grounds that it violated both due process and the 1868 
Burlingame Treaty, which not only guaranteed immigration between China 
and the United States but also affirmed the “inherent and inalienable right 
of a man to change his home and allegiance.”39 The Court ruled against 
Chae Chan Ping, declaring that “treaties are of no greater legal obligation 
than an Act of Congress, and are subject to such Acts of Congress may 
pass for their enforcement, modification, or repeal.”40 The Court’s decision 
against Chae Chan Ping, however, did not address the central point of his 
appeal— that his constitutional rights to due process as well as his con- 
stitutionally protected property rights— had been violated.41 Instead, the 
majority opinion, written by Justice Stephen Fields, began with the reasser-
tion of the warmaking power of Congress, laying the groundwork for how 
it would interpret and support the abrogation of the government’s prior treaty 
with China. He cited the yellow peril rhetoric of the 1878 California Consti-
tutional Convention’s characterization of the Chinese immigrants’ refusal 
to assimilate and their increased numbers, which approached “the character 
of an Oriental invasion.”42 In this series of equivalences between immigration 
and invasion, the Court deemed assimilation an index of aggression and the 
immigrant “alien” as fundamentally inassimilable. Moreover, as Matthew J. 
Lindsay notes, the alien gave “substance to the metaphor of invasion,” 
“enabl[ing] the Supreme Court to transform the immigration power from a 
species of commercial regulation to a power inherent in sovereignty.”43
Defending the nation from foreign invaders is a power inherent in sover-
eignty, and it is in the Chinese Exclusion Case that plenary power is most 
forcefully articulated. As Chief Justice Fields states (citing Chief Justice John 
Marshall’s decision in The Exchange, 7 Cranch 116, 11 U.S. 136), “That the gov-
ernment of the United States, through the action of the legislative depart-
ment, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not 
think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its territory to that extent is an 
incident of every independent nation.”44 While asserting a claim that is part 
of common international law, he goes on to declare that the courts would 
defer to the political branches of government regarding national security, and 
that any less would be a constraint on U.S. sovereignty:
Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would 
imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an 
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investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could 
impose such restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete 
power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the con-
sent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source.45
In this passage, according to legal theorist Alexander Aleinikoff, is born 
the plenary power doctrine. Congress is here conferred “all the power that 
a sovereign state may have to regulate the entry of aliens,” and it is further 
stated that “the courts would not subject congressional choices to any limi-
tations on federal power located elsewhere in the Constitution.”46 This judi-
cial deference to Congress with regards to immigration, therefore, renders 
those who have been designated as “aliens” vulnerable, unprotected by the 
Constitution. “All exceptions,” Justice Fields argues, “must be traced up to the 
consent of the nation itself,” an argument that posits exceptions as outside 
the domain of the judiciary, an “extraconstitutional” space yet within the ter-
ritorial boundaries of the nation.
The justification for Chae Chan Ping’s exclusion as a security issue effec-
tively codified immigration as a central front of a race war. The equation 
between immigration and invasion is predicated on racializing the immi-
grant as a “foreign” threat to the social, moral, and racial order of the United 
States. As a foreign alien, Chae Chan Ping is no longer an immigrant in 
need of constitutional protection or able to realize the promise of constitu-
tional freedoms, but rather whose fundamental and inassimilability threat-
ens the constitutional rights and security of those within a white nation. 
Here I quote Justice Fields at length:
It matters not in what form such aggression and encroachment come, whether 
from the foreign nation acting in its national character or from vast hordes 
of its people crowding in upon us. . . . If, therefore, the government of the 
United States, through its legislative department, considers the presence of for-
eigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us to be 
dangerous to its peace and surety, their exclusion is not to be stayed because at 
the time there are no actual hostilities with the nation of which foreigners are 
subjects. The existence of war would render the necessity of the proceeding 
only more obvious and pressing. The same necessity, in a less pressing degree, 
may arise when war does not exist, and with the same authority which 
adjudges the necessity in one case must also determine it in the other. In 
both cases its determination is conclusive upon the judiciary. (emphasis 
added)47
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The essentialization of immigrants as security threats by virtue of their 
racial difference rationalizes what Hiroshi Motomura calls “immigration 
exceptionalism,” in which immigration matters are cast as “exceptional” to 
constitutional procedures and due process. As an example of “immigration 
exceptionalism,” Justice Fields states that war is merely an indication of the 
degree and urgency of the exercise of plenary power and not the necessary 
condition for its exercise.48 The authority granted to Congress with respect 
to immigration law is derived from “the same authority” that enables Con-
gress to declare war. But what is most revealing in the above passage is not 
that war necessitates the exceptional suspension of constitutional protections. 
Rather, the “mere presence of foreigners of a different race” triggers this “same 
necessity”— the suspension of rights— even “when war does not exist.”
The absence of war does not mean the absence of “aggression and en- 
croachment,” and the phrase, “It matters not what form such aggression and 
encroachment come,” requires some comment. If the forms of aggression 
and encroachment are irrelevant, then any congressional response to per-
ceived aggression and encroachment need not be contained by or tethered 
to the immediate events at hand. The formlessness that is implied here pro-
vides great latitude in the interpretation of what constitutes aggression and 
encroachment, suggesting that it not the “form” that is open- ended, but the 
“content.” In other words, it matters not who is a foreigner but that the des-
ignation of the “foreigner” is performative, potentially triggering the exer-
cise of plenary power and codifying the immigrant’s foreignness into “an 
object of immigration power” as well as a threat to the “nation form.”49 The 
presence or figure of the foreigner becomes the condition for constitutional 
exceptionality such that immigration and the threat of crowding “vast hordes” 
necessitate preemptive measures to secure white territory. Here, plenary 
power is a normalized feature of immigration regulation such that deporta-
tion, the militarization of the border, and the suspension of due process and 
civil rights are not simply the features of immigration regulation but are, 
rather, the weapons of immigration regulation as war. If war is sanctioned 
violence in the name of national security, then these forms of immigration 
regulation perpetrate state- sanctioned violence on a daily basis; this per- 
manent war, codified by the Chinese Exclusion Case, is a quotidian function 
and feature of inherent sovereignty, and one that terrorizes and primarily 
targets people of color in the name of white security.
The intersections of security, territory, and property become more vis- 
ible in the case of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock. In the Chinese Exclusion Case, 
the courts “emphasized the role of the United States’ right to exclude as a 
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means of achieving safety and security within its own property.”50 In Lone 
Wolf, settler colonial expansion and the conversion of Indigenous lands into 
white property become folded under the exigencies of invasion. The “for-
eigner” initially defined as extrinsic to U.S. territory becomes, as in the case 
of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, untethered to territory, a figure who “threat- 
ens” the coherence of U.S. territorial sovereignty from within and without. 
Just as the Chinese Exclusion Case has been seminal in immigration history, 
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock “enjoys” a similar place in American Indian legal his-
tory in its devastation of tribal sovereignty and massive land theft. Coming 
thirteen years after the Chinese Exclusion Case, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, in 
which the court justified the abrogation of treaties with the confederated 
tribes of Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches, is “still cited for its principal 
holding: that Congress has plenary power to abrogate the terms of Indian 
treaties.”51
The justification for the breaking of treaties as a necessity of the state, laid 
out in the Chinese Exclusion Case, remerges in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock by 
casting the confederated tribes as “stateless”– neither full sovereign nations 
nor citizen- subjects protected by the Constitution— and an implicit “threat” 
to the territorial coherence of the United States. Lone Wolf, a Kiowa chief, 
put forth an injunction to stop a bill that would take away land that had 
been protected under the Medicine Hat Treaty of 1867. In 1889 the govern-
ment, represented by Commissioner David Jerome, offered each member 
of the confederated tribes a 160- acre allotment and $2 million for the sur-
plus land after allotment. As the Medicine Hat Treaty stipulated, such trans-
actions needed the consent of three- fourths of the male population. Lone 
Wolf contended that the agreement signed on October 6, 1892, was based on 
government fraud and misrepresentation of the terms of the agreement and 
that the subsequent modified bill, which had passed through both chambers 
of Congress, did so without tribal consultations. In his appellate brief, Lone 
Wolf and his lawyers argued that this new bill would violate the terms of 
their treaty and also would violate the Fifth Amendment, which protected 
their property rights. Ruling against the appellant, however, the Supreme 
Court dismissed Lone Wolf ’s claims over this constitutional breach by blur-
ring the distinctions between “foreign nations” and “wards of the nation,” 
arguing that the confederated tribes were both simultaneously. The court 
circumvented the question of constitutionality by declaring that “plenary 
authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by 
Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a 
political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the 
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government.” Moreover, the Court insisted that abrogation of treaties was 
the domain of Congress, noting that “as with treaties made with foreign 
nations, Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600, the legislative power might 
pass laws in conflict with treaties made with the Indians.”52 In this section of 
the ruling, the court argued that the abrogation of the treaty was entirely con-
sistent with plenary power— just as it was in the Chinese Exclusion Case— 
and a power inherent in U.S. sovereignty.
Despite the devastating impact of this decision on tribal rights and sov-
ereignty, it is not entirely clear why the Chinese Exclusion Case was cited in 
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock. The Court defended the abrogation of the Medicine 
Hat Treaty as a congressional prerogative vis- a- vis other “foreign nations” 
as in the case with China. As Philip Frickey notes, this justification of the 
power to abrogate treaties effectively “conjoined the plenary power over 
Indian affairs with a similarly expansive authority over immigration recog-
nized in the Chinese Exclusion Case.”53
But “if Congress did indeed have unfettered plenary power over the tribes,” 
as David Wilkins points out, “why did it not simply use it all the time?”54 Vine 
Deloria Jr. also notes that the designation of American Indians as “foreign 
nations” has a tortured and contradictory set of precedents, notably United 
States v. Kagama (1885), which posited American Indians as both “foreign 
nations” and “wards of the nation,” and which the Court also cited.55 Given 
these earlier examples and precedents, why reroute the abrogation of treaties 
with “foreign nations” through citing the Chinese Exclusion Case, and what is 
the significance of justifying this land theft “on the backs of the Chinese”?56
Sarah Cleveland argues that these cases are conjoined by the concept of 
“sovereign necessity,” which justified the use of plenary power.57 In the case 
of Lone Wolf, sovereign necessity cannot be constrained by considerations 
of the Fifth Amendment and property rights. This conception of sovereign 
necessity is reflected in the Court’s rationale:
To uphold the claim would be to adjudge that the indirect operation of 
the treaty was to materially limit and qualify the controlling authority of 
Congress in respect to the care and protection of the Indians, and to deprive 
Congress, in a possible emergency, when the necessity might be urgent for 
a partition and disposal of the tribal lands, of all power to act, if the assent 
of the Indians could not be obtained.58
Here the Court invokes emergency and necessity as the rationale for judicial 
deference to Congress. But as Deloria points out, Congress had “dilly- dallied” 
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for eight years before submitting its amended bill, and the “sense of urgency, 
therefore, is slight.”59 This routing of the appropriation of land through the 
Chinese Exclusion Case performatively renders both the undermining of 
tribal sovereignty (Native property rights) and U.S. settler colonial expan-
sion as necessities of state security. As the Chinese Exclusion Case reveals, 
it matters not “what form” the aggression and encroachment to settler sov-
ereignty may take. The Chinese Exclusion Case’s codification of Chinese 
laborers as invaders becomes the means by which the racialization of labor 
and property renders those certain property rights no longer constitution-
ally protected. As Rose Cuison Villazor persuasively argues, the Chinese 
Exclusion Case forged a connection between property and sovereignty by 
denying Chan Chae Ping’s argument that the exclusion violated his property 
rights.60 In conjoining expansive congressional authority over Indian affairs 
and immigration, Lone Wolf codifies territorial expansion and white propri-
etorial logics as a security issue borne out of settler sovereign necessity.
The theory of necessity, Giorgio Agamben argues, is “none other than 
a theory of exception. . . . Necessity is not the source of law, nor does it 
properly suspend the law; it merely releases a particular case from the literal 
application of the norm.”61 But in a case focused on Indigenous property 
rights and treaty abrogation, what counts as “sovereign necessity”? The argu-
ment that underlies sovereign necessity, I would argue, is not the impending 
threat of invasion but the presence of “foreigners of a different race” in white 
settler territory, defined as invasion itself. The citation of the Chinese Exclu-
sion Case, in this instance, is not merely a reference to “foreign nations” 
but a means of codifying American Indians as “foreigners of a different 
race.” That is, it serves to racialize Indigenous peoples as alien others who 
threaten white property ownership from within. Described in Lone Wolf 
as “dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. 
Dependent for their political rights,” they are “foreign nations” who have 
been domesticated. And in “domesticating” what had been primarily the 
domain of the international, the Court effectively “domesticated” plenary 
power, expanding the domain of its reach.62 The Court circumvented both 
assertions of Indigenous sovereignty and protests of congressional over-
reach, thus limiting the options for legal challenges to congressional power 
over tribes.63
This conjoining of these two cases in terms of constitutional exceptionality 
reveals how the management of territorial coherence, expulsion, deportation 
and dispossession are temporally constitutive of the “inherent sovereignty” 
of whiteness. While Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock connects immigration law and 
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Indian law by positing both as racialized “foreign nations,” the threat these 
different foreign nations pose are located in antithetical and shifting tem- 
poral coordinates. Whereas the invasion of the Chinese immigrants needs 
to be preemptively mitigated, the legal rationale for the exercise of plenary 
authority in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock depends on the construction of American 
Indians as relics of the past, “remnants of a race once powerful, now weak 
and diminished in numbers.”64 The characterization of this once “powerful 
now weak” race both resurrects the Indian Wars and the tropes of a nation 
under siege by rewriting treaty abrogation and expropriation of Native land 
as a continuation of national security.
In Deportation Nation Daniel Kanstroom tracks how the Indian Removal 
Acts are precursors to Asian exclusion and subsequent policies of deporta-
tion. In this historical account, Asian expulsion and deportation are a legacy 
of the policies of Indian removal. But if we also understand deportation not 
simply as removal from territory but also as a juridical technique of settler 
sovereignty, then this technique of permanent war works to racialize sub-
jects as “deportable” into a “constitution- free” zone in the name of national 
security. The “fiction” of the Chinese Exclusion Case, Cleveland notes, is 
reflected and promulgated by its very name. This decision effectively re- 
framed Chae Chan Ping’s case of deportation into one of exclusion by re- 
defining a legal permanent resident (which he was) into a new applicant 
whose entry and property rights could be denied.65 In this context, Lone 
Wolf v. Hitchcock’s citation of The Chinese Exclusion Case as a precedent 
also affirms the efficacy of plenary power to deport racialized subjects re- 
gardless of their legal status into “constitution- free zones.”66 The citation 
of the Chinese Exclusion Case thus not only racializes American Indians but 
also “manufactures” deportability as a possible legal mode of security. In 
Yellow Woman and a Beauty of the Spirit, Leslie Marmon Silko writes of the 
menacing fear of living in a “border patrol state” and the numerous times 
she is pulled over by border patrol and forced to show her ID.67 Despite 
being Laguna Pueblo, Silko describes being subject to what Rachael Ida Buff 
calls “deportation terror,” a state of perpetual war founded on a sovereign 
necessity in which constitutional exceptions are normalized to securitize 
whiteness.68
the coMPulsory relation of sovereiGnt y and PerManent War
What the plenary power cases reveal is the extent to which the conjoining 
of Asian exclusion and American Indian dispossession is central to the racial 
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regime of U.S. settler sovereignty. State sovereignty, as Giorgio Agamben 
argues, is inseparable from the state of exception and a “constitution- free 
zone.” Mark Rifkin, in his rethinking of Agamben’s theory of sovereignty 
in relation to American Indians, argues that Native peoples are also figured 
as exceptions to the state.69 According to Rifkin, Native peoples are the irre-
solvable exception to a U.S. sovereignty organized around territorial coher-
ence. Oscillating between independent treaty- making nations and “wards 
of the nation,”70 and captured in the oxymoronic phrase “domestic depen-
dent nations,”71 Native peoples are simultaneously figured as inside and out-
side the nation- state. Their exceptional status, Rifkin argues, is indicative 
of “the absence of an appropriate legal framework” to account for Native 
peoples and it is precisely the creation of the state of exception for Native 
peoples that performatively founds U.S. sovereignty. Similarly, Patrick Wolfe 
suggests that American Indian “exceptionalism” preserves and rationalizes 
the contradictions in the human rights discourse enshrined in the U.S. con-
stitution and the government’s systematic denial of American Indian rights. 
According to Wolfe, “Indian policy instantiates a nulificatory component 
of US constitutional discourse.”72 In different ways, both Rifkin and Wolfe 
demonstrate— through the analytic of the exception— how Native peoples 
exceed and trouble the coherence of a territorial sovereignty rationalized 
and formalized through the discourse of constitutional rights. Whereas Wolfe 
describes the practical exception as corpus nullius, which effaces Indian sub-
jecthood, Rifkin characterizes as “bare inhabitance” a shift away from the 
individuation of Agamben’s bare life to focus on a politics of collectivity 
and occupancy to challenge the process of the individuation instrumental 
to Indigenous dispossession.
The Native state of exception, however, is also dependent on the state of 
permanent war, in which the peculiarization of Natives is defined in terms 
of a “compulsory relation to territorial boundaries [that] thus threaten[s] the 
security and coherence of statehood.”73 This compulsory relation to national 
territorial boundaries can only be externalized as threats to the security of 
these boundaries. Rifkin argues that Agamben’s emphasis on bare life “leave[s] 
little room for thinking indigeneity, the existence of peoples forcibly made 
domestic whose self- understandings and aspirations cannot be understood 
in terms of the denial of (or disjunctions within) state citizenship.”74 He 
argues that the “topos of sovereignty designates less a content that can be 
replaced (a racist vision of Indian savagery, a Eurocentric resistance to Native 
customs) than a process of compulsory relation, one predicated on the sup-
posedly unquestionable fact of national territorial boundaries.”75
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While this process of Native compulsory relation is “predicated on the 
unquestionable fact of national boundaries” and is shaped by relations of 
“exceptionality,” this account does not address the legacy of the Chinese Exclu-
sion Case and its relationship to Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock. And here I again turn 
to Agamben to foreground his theorization of sovereignty. While much has 
been made of the grammatical structure of the exception to the coherence 
of the state, Agamben’s theorization of the example is also crucial to under-
standing the compulsory relation of immigrants, racialized as invaders, to 
the state. According to Agamben, “Both exception and example constitute 
the two modes by which a set tries to found and maintain its own coher-
ence.”76 Both exception and example are the central modes by which sover-
eignty is cohered and maintained, and as Agamben notes, these two modes 
are not distinct but rather blur into each other, deriving their force from their 
juridical proximations of each other.77 The exception is unthinkable without 
the example; the paradigmatic example denotes the limit by which that excep-
tionality is marked as “exceptional.” “In every case,” according to Agamben, 
“exception and example are correlative concepts that are ultimately indistin-
guishable and that come into play every time the very sense of belonging and 
commonality of individuals is to be defined.”78 Just as state sovereignty is 
powered by the constant state of exception, so too is it dependent on a para- 
digm of otherness through which the territorial anxieties and Indigeneity 
invoked by the exceptional status of American Indians are managed. If, as 
both Rifkin and Wolfe formulate, Native peoples are the exception by which 
U.S. settler state sovereignty depends, then Chinese immigrants are the para-
digmatic example of the “foreigner” whose unassimilable difference becomes 
the means by which the U.S. settler state performatively manages and tries 
to contain the territorial anxieties posed by the Native state of exception.
Though the exception and the example are crucial for the founding and 
maintenance of white settler sovereignty, their mechanisms are different. The 
exception “is an inclusive exclusion (which thus serves to include what is ex- 
cluded),” whereas the example “instead functions as an exclusive inclusion.”79 
Put differently, the “inclusive exclusion” of Native peoples acknowledges their 
“inherent sovereignty” while domesticating and undermining that inde-
pendence through the insistence on the geographic unity of the nation. 
An exclusive inclusion is premised on the example’s paradigmatic status, 
which necessitates its exclusion from the set of which it is paradigmatic. 
The example is embodied by Chinese immigrants, whose otherness spatial-
izes the promise of assimilation through their exclusion, affirming the “sup-
posedly unquestionable fact of national territorial boundaries.” Thus just as 
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Native struggles for sovereignty do not work within the framework of state 
citizenship, these are precisely the governing terms by which Asian immi-
grants have sought inclusion; that is, their struggles for political intelligi- 
bility— centered on domestic inclusion and citizenship— both affirms these 
values as the telos of immigration and yet is premised upon their exclusion 
from this polity, this “nation of immigrants,” that they, in their radical alien 
difference, exemplify but cannot belong to.80 The regulatory technologies 
of interrogation, documentation, registration, deportation, and surveillance 
that were developed to enforce Chinese exclusion— the first race- and class- 
based immigration exclusion law— have become the norm by which Home-
land Security manages and polices its national borders.81 The “immigrant” 
as a biopolitical and juridical subject is, in other words, constituted through 
the singularity of the exclusion of Chinese immigrants and also their exem-
plarity. And by virtue of exemplarity, they must be kept outside of the nation.82
But security threats defined as “form without content,” to reiterate the 
words of Chief Justice Fields, are defined in terms of a compulsory relation 
to the state. That is, “form without content” renders the content of these 
threats interchangeable, fluid, and even permeable. The shifting racial tax-
onomies and juridical constructions of “Indian” and “Chinese” as national 
security threats give form to U.S. state of exception and sovereignty not 
through their content, but through their compulsory relation to settler sov-
ereignty. In these cases, the discursive forms of the “Indian” and “Chinese” 
becomes the means by which the settler state attempts to resolve its racial 
and territorial anxieties. Thus it matters not whether the terrorist is “Indian” 
or “Chinese,” “Native” or “Foreign,” “Citizen” or “Immigrant,” only that they 
can potentially and simultaneously be both. And they are simultaneously 
both by virtue of their compulsory relation to U.S. settler sovereignty and to 
the formation of a “constitution- free zone” crucial to the securing of white 
property and territory.
While I began this article by foregrounding the two concurrent executive 
orders and the rhetoric of national security that justifies this exceptional 
exercise of government power, this permanent race war is broader than 
these two examples would suggest. The doctrine of plenary power is a nor-
malized feature of the settler security state such that it operates openly and 
yet invisibly. Justifications for the extrajudicial killings of African Amer- 
icans by police officers persistently point to the “security threats” posed 
by these unarmed civilians. The securitizing of white property, as Cheryl 
Harris, Cedric Robinson, Ruth Gilmore Wilson, and Jared Sexton, among 
others, have argued, is inseparable from the laws of racial capitalism and the 
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commodification and criminalization of Black bodies central to its opera-
tions. In light of the recent anti- immigrant policies, increased ICE raids 
and deportations, the seizure of Indigenous lands for oil pipelines, the aban-
donment of Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria, and the militarized policing 
of African Americans and other communities of color, it is clear that new 
comparative and intersectional frameworks of analyses are necessary. In 
positing the plenary powers doctrine as an important object of critical ethnic 
studies critique, it is my hope that more scholars will examine how plenary 
power differentially organizes the settler colonial logics of white security, 
territory, and property.
Plenary power and its consolidation of white settler sovereignty con- 
tinues to constitute and racialize Indigenous peoples, colonized peoples, 
immigrants, and people of color as security threats. And it is the construc-
tion and presence of racialized threats to white settler society that give rise 
to the conditions of permanent war. The compulsory relations of Ameri- 
can Indians and Asian Americans to U.S. sovereignty legitimates a state of 
permanent war untethered to geographic and territorial specificity. What is 
international can be made domestic and vice versa. The conjoined figures 
of the U.S. settler sovereignty— the “Indian” and the “Chinese”— mediate the 
tension and oscillation between the territorial boundaries of the nation and 
its content, between the abstract ideal of the citizen subject and its racial-
ized embodiment, between the inclusive exclusion of American Indians 
and the inclusive exclusion of Asian immigrants, and between the compul-
sory relation of American Indian exception and the coercive replacement 
of the Asian immigrant example. They are conjoined precisely because of 
their lack of content and their compulsory and structural relation to settler 
sovereignty. While the effects of plenary power on communities are not com-
mensurate or even, plenary power’s agility in racializing conquest and con-
stituting white settler security are dependent on the formlessness of threats to 
state sovereignty. The object of plenary power— the regulation, removal, and 
containment of colonized and racialized immigrant subjects— is defended 
as powers inherent in white settler sovereignty.
Permanent war has been and continues to be the condition of our con-
temporary moment. In advocating for solidarity in terms of simultaneity, 
however, I am cautious about making claims regarding what the outcomes 
and forms of antiracist decolonization and resistance could look like because 
such a synchronic framing temporarily forecloses examining the progres-
sive possibilities and consequences that a diachronic view enables. But soli-
darity in simultaneity enables one way of thinking through the mechanism 
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and techniques that bifurcate and position dispossession and elimination as 
temporally distinct and thus isolated from the juridical conjoining of exclu-
sion and deportation. Simultaneity is an attempt to bring a moment of this 
perpetual state violence within view. In the amicus brief submitted by the 
Fred Korematsu Center for Law and Equality challenging the legality of this 
travel ban, Robert Chang et al. question the invocation of the plenary power 
to justify the president’s “unreviewable authority.”83 The center is named after 
Fred Korematsu, who challenged the constitutionality of Japanese Ameri-
can internment during World War II. The Fred Korematsu Center for Law 
and Equity also joined in the “Memorandum of Amici Curiae” in support 
of the Standing Rock Sioux challenge to the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers 
and Dakota Access LLP, reminding us of the connection between deten- 
tion, deportation, terror, and territorial expansion.84 As the example of these 
amicus briefs show, solidarity, therefore, need not be based on identity, col-
lectivity, or even shared experiences. Rather it is an attempt to resist the 
divergent temporalities that continue to divide and compartmentalize the 
simultaneous and multiple projects of white settler sovereignty.
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session, imperial expansion, and immigrant exclusion in the securitization 
of settler state sovereignty.
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